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Proactive Policing On MerseysideWed, September 19, 2001Source: Alana Barton and Roger EvansProactive Policing On Merseyside Policing & Reducing Crime Briefing NoteBackground
to the research
This
report provides an in-depth case study of the development and implementation of
a proactive policing strategy by Merseyside Police. The project was conducted as
part of the then Police Research Group’s Police Operations Against Crime
Research Programme. The report examines Merseyside’s experience of developing a
force-wide proactive strategy, involving officers of all ranks and roles and
encompassing all areas of policing, not just crime. It identifies a number of
important lessons that should provide useful guidance for other forces
considering proactive policing. As an early attempt at ‘mainstreaming’ such an
approach, it is particularly relevant to the Targeted Policing Initiative of the
government’s Crime Reduction Programme. The
12 month study (April 1996 to April 1997) consisted of periods of observation in
six selected areas and centralised units, interviews with police officers of all
ranks, questionnaire surveys, and the analysis of files and reports. Summary
of key findings The
Merseyside
Model Merseyside
believe they have fundamentally embraced proactivity. As a result of a wider
force re-organisation, they have developed what they term a ‘holistic’ strategy.
Their approach is based on an ‘ideal model’:
Implementing
proactive policing Merseyside
began restructuring in 1991 and this had a significant impact on both policing
methods and culture in the force. The most important changes
included:
Crime
Management Units (CMUs)
were originally introduced in January 1995 and consisted of a crime desk staffed
by a sergeant, uniformed constables and civilian support. They received all
crime reports, screening out crimes with no likelihood of detection and
allocating those, which could be investigated. Following a force thematic review
of CMUs, ‘model’ arrangements and corporate standards were developed in March
1997. These focused on management of intelligence, training and communication
issues. The
Force Intelligence System (FIS)
was introduced in 1992 after a force review concluded that Merseyside would
benefit from a centralized computerised system for processing and storing
intelligence. Although this ‘Oracle’ system was capable of interfacing with
systems from other forces, it could not do so with other systems used within
Merseyside. However, it was decided that the long term potential of the system
outweighed these short term problems and it was ‘rolled out’ across the force at
the end of April 1997. The
Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB)
was established in May 1994. It supported the FIS and the collection, input and
analysis
of information force-wide; - authorised
electronic surveillance and the collection of information from a variety of
external sources and agencies; - held the source registry for all informants and
received registry requests; - made ‘threat assessments’ for target crime
syndicates; and - contained a strategic Intelligence Cell (IC) which supported
the work of the Major Crime Unit (MCU). The
MCU was
created in November 1996 to bring the centralised specialist squads together and
create a common IC to support their proactive operations. This cell was the main
point of contact with the FIB and provided intelligence support for all
operational activities of the MCU. One of its main functions was to research the
structure, organisation, composition and activities of the identified syndicates
using proactive techniques such as the strategic tasking of informants, and
electronic and physical surveillance. ‘What
works’: evaluating implementation Statistical
data standardised across areas were unavailable but, based on a mixture of
observation and interviews with some officers, some parts of the process seemed
to have worked well while there remained some problems in other
areas. To
a greater or lesser degree, all areas had taken steps to identify the needs of
the area and had attempted to adapt their proactive strategies
accordingly. The
Informant Tasking Team, initially piloted in one area, clearly improved
intelligence gathering capabilities of all areas and encouraged force-wide
communication. In
terms of adhering to corporate standards and force ‘vision’, none of the areas
could be described as the ‘ideal model’: - only the areas piloting corporate
standards came close to the recommended standards in management of intelligence.
- Most areas were developing effective communication structures as a priority;
and - crime pattern analysis systems were lacking in all
areas. In terms of the centralised
units, the MCU and FIB were considered to be centres
of excellence by the force:
Obstacles to proactivity
The
process of implementing Merseyside’s proactive model highlighted the following
potential problems:
Merseyside
has recognised
and are tackling most of these and intend to monitor the progress through the
introduction of PIs. Conclusions The
report concludes that an ‘holistic’ approach to proactive policing is unlikely
to be successful without comprehensive organisational
and cultural change. Attempts to shift from reactive to proactive methods of
criminal investigation, in isolation from these broader changes, are likely to
have only a limited impact. An effective intelligence cycle must be at the
centre
of such a strategy. This cycle will depend heavily upon effective computerised
intelligence systems and skilled intelligence analysts. Proactivity
can only work in practice if serious efforts are made to avoid blockages and
breaks in the intelligence cycle. It is also important to ensure that proactive
policing does not become confined to small squads and teams but is viewed as an
overarching strategy to which all officers can contribute in different
ways. Points
for action Forces
intending to adopt an ‘holistic’ proactive approach should consider
the:
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